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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES T. GRIFFITH, ] 
Applicant-Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
Case No. 870208-CA 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ] 
UTAH, WORKERS COMPENSATION ] 
FUND, and or CEDAR CITY COCA ] 
COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, ] 
SECOND INJURY FUND, ] 
Defendants-Respondents ] 
i Classification Priority 6 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
and/or CEDAR CITY COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PRECEEDINGS 
This is an original proceeding seeking review by the Utah 
Court of Appeals of an Order of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah which denied the applicant's application for temporary 
total disability compensation for the period of May 3, 1985 
through December 29, 1985. 
This Court is authorized to conduct a review of the 
Commission's Order pursuant to .the provisions of Section 
35-1-83, Utah Code Annotated. (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the 
Industrial Commission of Utah acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in denying the Applicant-Appellant temporary total 
disability compensation from the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah for the period of May 3, 1985 through December 29, 1985. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
35-1-65. U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED. TEMPORARY DISABILITY -
AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS - STATE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE DEFINED. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall 
receive 66 2/3% of that employee's average weekly wages at the 
time of the injury so long as such disability is total, but not 
more than a maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four such dependent children, not to exceed the average weekly 
wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to 
exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury over a period of eight 
years from the date of the injury. 
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In the event a light duty medical release is obtained 
prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of recovery, and 
when no such light duty employment is available to the employee 
from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue 
to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in 
chapters 1 and 2 of this Title shall be determined by the 
commission as follows: on or about June 1 of each year, the 
total wages reported on contribution reports to the department 
of employment security under the commission for the preceding 
calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured 
workers reported for the preceding year by twelve. The average 
annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 52, and the 
average weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest 
dollar. The state average weekly wage as so determined shall 
be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation 
rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occupational 
disease which occurred during the twelve-month period 
commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any 
death resulting therefrom. 
35-1-84. U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED. (EFFECTIVE 
THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1987). FURNISHING AND CERTIFYING 
PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSCRIPT TO SUPREME COURT - POWER OF COURT TO 
AFFIRM OR SET ASIDE AWARD - GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE. 
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Upon the filing of the action for review the court 
shall direct the commission to furnish and certify to the 
Supreme Court, within twenty days, all proceedings and the 
transcript of evidence taken in the case, and the matter shall 
be determined upon the record of the commission as certified by 
it. Upon such review the court may affirm or set aside such 
award, but only upon the following grounds: 
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of 
its powers; 
(2) That the findings of fact do not support the 
award. 
31-1-85, U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED. (EFFECTIVE THROUGH 
DECEMBER 31, 1987). DUTY OF COMMISSION TO MAKE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - FILING - CONCLUSIVENESS ON 
QUESTION OF FACT - REVIEW - COURT JUDGMENT. 
After each formal hearing, it shall be the duty of the 
commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
writing and file the same with its secretary. The findings and 
conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be 
conclusive and final and shall not be subject to review; such 
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings 
and conclusions of the commission. The commission and every 
party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall 
have the right to appear in the review proceeding. Upon the 
hearing the court shall enter judgment either affirming or 
setting aside the award. 
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35-1-88. U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED. RULES OF EVIDENCE 
AND PROCEDURE BEFORE COMMISSION AND HEARING EXAMINER -
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall 
be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of 
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or procedure, 
other than as herein provided or as adopted by the commission 
pursuant to this act. The commission may make its 
investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties 
and to carry out justly the spirit of the workmen's 
compensation act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as 
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and 
relevant including, but not limited to the following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open 
hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or 
of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the 
• commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time 
sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or 
diseased employee. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Applicant-Appellant herein has a long history of 
injury, both industrial and non-industrial, to both his left 
and right ankles. While the original Application for Hearing 
was filed on an injury occurring in December of 1983^ at 
hearing, and at issue before this Court, is an injury occurring 
on April 16, 1985. Subsequent to the administrative hearing in 
this matter, a single member medical panel was convened, and 
initially found that while the left ankle problems were all 
industrially related, the right ankle problem was not 
industrially related. Additionally, it was the panel's opinion 
that the Applicant-Appellant would not be entitled to any 
temporary total disability beyond the date of May 3, 1985. 
(R.252) Objections to the medical panel were filed by the 
Applicant-Appellant, and, after a review of the 
Applicant-Appellant's objections, the medical panel changed his 
opinion indicating in a one-sentence reply that the right ankle 
injury and surgery for that ankle should be considered 
industrial. Because of the confusion created by the Medical 
Panel Report, the Administrative Law Judge contacted counsel 
with the request that the issue of temporary total disability 
be negotiated. The Workers Compensation Fund, for settlement 
purposes, offered to pay temporary total disability 
compensation from the date of surgery, December 30, 1985, 
- 6 -
to April 2, 1986, the date the Applicant-Appellant was released 
to return to work by the treating physician, 
Dr. D. Ross McNaught. As there was no basis on which to base 
temporary total disability compensation, for the period of May 
3, 1985 through December 29, 1985, the Workers Compensation 
Fund denied liability for this period. Along with the Workers 
Compensation Fund's letter dated February 11, 1987 containing 
its proposal for settlement, substantial evidence was attached 
for the Applicant-Appellant's review. (R.229-242) The 
Applicant-Appellant refused this offer of settlement and 
requested that the Administrative Law Judge rule on the issue 
of temporary total disability for this period. (R.220) The 
Administrative Law Judge, based upon the evidence submitted, 
concluded that the Applicant-Appellant herein was not entitled 
to temporary total disability compensation for the period of 
May 3, 1985 through December 29, 1985. Following the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order denying these benefits, the 
Applicant-Appellant asked the Administrative Law Judge for a 
reconsideration of her decision. (R.256-257) The 
Administrative Law Judge, on April 7, 1987, responded to the 
Applicant-Appellant, indicating, 
This letter will confirm our conversation of 
April 6, 1987. As I indicated at that time, 
your letter of March 19, 1987, has been 
considered, and I am not inclined to change my 
findings with regard to the period of temporary 
total disability. I think it is fairly clear 
from the record that your client was not able to 
have ankle surgery during that time because he 
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was stabilizing medically from other problems. 
In addition, he had several aggravations of his 
ankle problems which were not industrially 
related." (R.260) 
Subsequent to the Judge's denial of the request for 
reconsideration, the Applicant-Appellant filed a Motion for 
Review with the Industrial Commission. After a thorough review 
of the Commission file, the Motion for Review was denied, 
unanimously, by the Industrial Commission. (R.273-274) This 
appeal was then filed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The general standard of review for this Court in 
reviewing Industrial Commission findings is that the 
Commission's findings will be upheld in the absence of a 
showing that the order is arbitrary and capricious. 
2. When reviewing the Commission's findings as to 
issues of fact, the Commission will be upheld if the findings 
are not contrary to the law or the evidence submitted. 
3. The issue of disability is a matter of fact. As 
such, the Commission's determination of disability must be 
based upon all of the relevant facts submitted. 
4. The Administrative Law Judge's Order, as approved 
by the Industrial Commission, was supported by substantial 
medical evidence and other testimony reviewed pursuant to 
Section 35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
5. The burden of proof is on the Applicant to 
establish disability. This burden has not been met by the 
Applicant-Appellant herein. 
6. In cases where disability is being claimed, the 
applicant must prove that the industrial injury is the direct 
and proximate cause of the claimed disability. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE GENERAL STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS COURT IN 
REVIEWING INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FINDINGS IS THAT THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS WILL BE UPHELD IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
SHOWING THAT THE ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Blaine v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 700 P.2d L084, 1086 (Utah 1985), 
set forth the standard of review to be used on appeals taken 
from Industrial Commission decisions. The opinion states: 
This Court's standard of review of the 
Commission's records is set forth in U.C.A., 
1953, Section 35-1-84, which provides that the 
Court may affirm or set aside an order of the 
Commission only upon the following grounds: 
(1) That the Commission acted without 
or in excess of its powers; 
(2) That the findings of the fact do 
not support the award. 
This Court has interpreted the foregoing 
statutory standard on numerous occasions and has 
concluded that the Commission's findings are not 
to be displaced in the absence of a showing that 
they are arbitrary and capricious. [Footnote 
omitted] 
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard was reaffirmed 
in the case of Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P. 2d 109, 111 
(Utah 1986). In Rushton, the Court held: 
On an appeal from a decision by the Commission, 
this Court will not disturb the findings and 
orders of the Commission unless they are 
arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary 
and capricious when they are contrary to the 
evidence or without any reasonable basis in the 
evidence. 
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Because the Administrative Law Judge's decision was 
based on the evidence submitted at the time of hearing, the 
decision was not arbitrary and capricious and therefore, should 
not be overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
II 
WHEN REVIEWING THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AS TO ISSUES 
OF FACT, THE COMMISSION WILL BE UPHELD IF THE FINDINGS ARE NOT 
CONTRARY TO THE LAW OR THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED. 
The determinative statutes in this regard are 
contained in Sections 35-1-84 and 35-1-85, U.C.A. 1953. These 
statutes were interpreted by the Supreme Court of Utah in the 
case of Savage v. Industrial Commission, 565 P. 2d 782 (Utah 
1977) The Savage opinion reads in pertinent part: 
A look at appropriate statutes is necessary 
to determine whether this court can set aside the 
decision and order of the Commission. 
Section 35-1-85, U.C.A. 1953, reads: 
After each formal hearing, it 
shall be the duty of the commission to 
make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in writing and file the same 
with its secretary. The findings and 
conclusions of the Commission on 
questions of fact shall be conclusive 
and final and shall not be subject to 
review; Such questions of fact shall 
include ultimate facts and the 
findings and conclusions of the 
commission. The commission and every 
party to the action or proceeding 
before the commission shall have the 
right to appear in the review 
proceeding. Upon the hearing the 
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court shall enter judgment either 
affirming or setting aside the award. 
(Emphas is added.) 
Clearly the court, pursuant to the foregoing 
section and in the absence of an obvious abuse of 
discretion or under circumstances where the 
ruling is contrary to the evidence, does not have 
the authority to review findings of fact made by 
the Commission, and by implication, has only the 
power to consider issues of law dealing with the 
commission's decisions. 
Id. at 783. 
This review standard is additionally indicated in 
Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953, and is likewise addressed by the 
Savage Court: 
Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953, also limits the 
review of these matters by the court. That 
section provides in part as follows: 
. . . upon such review the court may 
affirm or set aside such award, but only 
upon the following grounds: 
(1) That the commission acted without 
or in excess of its powers; 
(2) That the findings of fact do not 
support the award. 
Looking at the evidence and the record in 
light most favorable to the Commission's 
findings, as we are obliged to do, the court 
will not interfer with the orders of the 
Commission unless it appears contrary to law 
or contrary to the evidence. [Emphasis added] 
Id. at 783. 
It is quite evident from the statutory mandate and the 
clear interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Utah, that 
the Appellate Court should not overturn Commission orders 
- 12 -




THE ISSUE OF DISABILITY IS A MATTER OF FACT. AS SUCH, 
THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY MUST BE BASED UPON 
ALL OF THE RELEVANT FACTS SUBMITTED. 
In the case of Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Industrial 
Commission, of State of Utah, 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985), the 
Supreme Court more particularly sets forth the reviewing 
standard in cases where disability is the issue of fact to be 
reviewed. In the Kaiser case, the Supreme Court holds: 
While disability claims are liberally 
construed in favor of awarding benefits, Prows v. 
Industrial Commission, Utah, 610 P.2d 1362 
(1980), we do not overturn the Commission's 
findings on appeal unless they are arbitrary or 
capricious, wholly without cause, contrary to the 
one inevitable conclusion from the evidence, or 
without any substantial evidence to support 
them. Kincheloe v. Coca-cola Bottling Co. of 
Odgen, Utah, 656 P.2d 440 (1982); Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Monfredi, Utah, 631 P.2d 888 (1981). 
Id. at 1169. 
The Supreme Court in this case indicated that if there 
was any substantial evidence to support the Commission's 
findings as to claims for disability, the Court would not 
overturn the Commission's findings. 
Additionally, in the case of Shipley v. C & W 
Contracting Co., 528 P.2d 153 (Utah 1974), the Supreme Court 
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indicates that when considering issues of fact in determining 
disability, all witnesses may be considered. The Shipley court 
states: 
We have no disagreement with the plaintiff's 
argument that it would be unjust and 
impermissible for the Commission to obdurately 
ignore clear, credible, and uncontradicted 
evidence so that its action is arbitrary and 
unreasonable. Yet is not necessarily bound to 
accept the opinions of any witness or witnesses, 
expert or otherwise, as to what its 
determination should be. If it were so, it 
should be obvious that this would turn the 
prerogative entirely over to the expert witness 
and would relieve the Commission of both its 
prerogative and its responsibility. This would 
be especially true in the case like this where 
it would seem that the question as to the degree 
of plaintiff's disability, both as to the 
percentage and the permanency thereof, and how 
it compares to specific disabilities listed in 
the statute, is not a problem in mathematics 
which can be determined with absolute certainty, 
but involves the exercise of some judgment upon 
which reasonable minds might vary in their 
conclusions. [Footnotes omitted] 
Id. at 155. 
Section 35-1-88, as reproduced above in the 
Determinative Statutes section of this brief, refers to 
evidence, in addition to witnesses' testimony, that may be 
reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission. 
The Rushton court interprets Section 35-1-88, as 
follows: 
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U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-88 permits the 
Commission to receive all 'relevant and material 
evidence,' including Commission-appointed 
investigators' reports and attending or examining 
physicians' reports. U.C.A., 1953, Section 
35-1-85, requires the Commission to make findings 
of fact and provides that those findings are 
conclusive. Moreover, decisions from the Court 
have repeatedly reaffirmed the fact-finding role 
of the Commission and have stated that the 
Commission must look at all relevant evidence in 
reaching its findings without being restricted to 
giving evidence from specific witnesses more 
weight than that from other witnesses. (See 
Shipley v. C & W Contracting Co., 528 P.2d 153, 
155 (Utah 1974) (the Commission is not necessarily 
bound to accept the opinions of any witness or 
witnesses, expert or otherwise); Mollerup Van 
Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah P.2d 235, 240, 398 P.2d 
882, 885 (1965) (the Commission had both the 
prerogative and duty to view the entire testimony 
of the medical panel doctor and believe those 
statments that impressed it). As the foreoing 
authorities indicate, the Commission is the 
principal fact finder and, as such, may review all 
relevant evidence. 
Id. at 111, 112. 
In I.G.A. Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P. 2d 828 (Utah 
1978), the Supreme Court again delineated the responsibility of 
the Industrial Commission to review all evidence submitted, and 
from that, to draw conclusions which are fairly and reasonably 
derived from the facts. In the Martin case, the Court states: 
. . . in so discharging its responsiblity, it 
was the prerogative and the duty of the 
Commission to consider not only the report of the 
medical panel, but also all of the other evidence 
and to draw whatever inferences and deductions 
fairly and reasonably could be derived therefrom. 
Id. at 830. 
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It is apparent from the above referenced cases that 
the directive from the Supreme Court to the Industrial 
Commission of Utah has been to evaluate all of the facts, 
whether medical or otherwise, in making a final determination 
as to the issue of fact concerning disability. 
ARGUMENT 
IV 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S ORDER, AS APPROVED BY 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL MEDICAL 
EVIDENCE AND OTHER TESTIMONY REVIEWED PURSUANT TO SECTION 
35-1-88, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED. 
Before establishing that there was substantial 
evidence supporting the Administrative Law Judge's Order and 
the Commission's affirmation, the facts as set forth by the 
Applicant-Appellant must be reviewed. On page 6 of the 
Applicant-Appellant's brief, the first paragraph reviews a few 
of the injuries documented for the Applicant-Appellant. The 
brief does, however, leave out a number of additional injuries 
which are documented in the record. The Applicant-Appellant 
sustained an injury to his left ankle in December of 1978, 
another in March of 1979, and a sprain to his right ankle on 
March 12, 1984. (R.250, 164) The reference to the reports 
oment of dical panel in the middle of page 7 of the 
Applicant-Appellant's brief should refer to the record at page 
203, 204, and 219 rather than the indication that the medical 
panel was additionally evidenced on page 214. 
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The Defendants-Respondents take strong exception to 
the Applicant-Appellant's indications beginning on the bottom 
of page 7 of the Applicant-Appellant' s brief that there were 
"lengthy attempts at treating the Applicant-Appellant in a 
conservative fashion without having to resort to surgery." For 
this proposition, the Applicant-Appellant refers to the record 
at page 226. The letter contained on page 226 says nothing 
whatsoever of conservative care. Rather, it directly refers to 
the concern with the Applicant-Appellant's other "severe 
medical problems" which had caused a cardiac arrest with the 
same surgery on the opposite ankle. Continuing on page 8, it 
is alleged that stabilization of the Applicant-Appellant's 
hypertension must be achieved before surgery. For this 
allegation, the Applicant-Appellant refers to the record at 
page 222. Page 222 contains a letter from the 
Applicant-Appellant stating: 
It is our position that Mr. Griffith could not be 
treated surgically as he was on December 30, 
1985, until Dr. Alfaro was able to bring his 
blood pressure within acceptable limits. (R.222) 
While the Defendants-Respondents would admit that 
hypertension was one of the concerns considered before surgery, 
a letter directly from the Applicant-Ape11ant stating the 
position of the Applicant-Appellant will hardly support an 
allegation of medical fact. 
In the first complete paragraph of page 8 of the 
Applicant-Appellant's brief, it is indicated: 
- 17 -
The conservative treatment as attempted by 
Dr. McNaught did not successfully treat the 
Applicant-Appellant's injury and once his 
hypertension was stabilized, surgery was 
performed on December 30, 1985. (R.252) 
The Defendants-Respondents would admit that the 
Judge's findings do indicate that once the 
Applicant-Appellant's other conditions had stabilized, surgery 
was performed. However, once again the Applicant-Appellant 
alleges a conservative treatment program which is neither 
supported by the Judge's findings contained in the record from 
249 through 255, nor is it supported anywhere else in the 
record. 
The facts of the case as included in the record are 
subtantially different from those contained in the 
Applicant-Appellant's brief. The facts contained in the record 
support the fact that the Administrative Law Judge's Order, as 
affirmed by the entire Commission, was based on substantial 
evidence. 
Regarding the claimed injury of April 16, 1985, the 
records would indicate that the Applicant-Appellant's first 
visit for medical treatment was on April 16, 1985. That record 
indicates: 
Examination shows mild swelling of the ankle, 
both laterally and medially with associated 
tenderness and a limited range of motion, but is 
clinically stable. X-rays at Valley View Medical 
Center showed no evidence of fracture. The ankle 
has been braced and he will be off work for at 
least one week and will be checked in the office 
at that time. (R.119, Addendum p. 1) [Emphasis 
added] 
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The x-rays, taken also on April 16, 1985, the date of 
the alleged injury, indicate a history of frequent sprains and 
twists. (R. 120) The record also documents additional 
injuries prior to April 16, 1985. (R.47, 48, 164) The 
Applicant-Appellant by his own testimony reports intermittent 
problems with both ankles prior to 1981. (R.81) On April 16, 
1985, the treating physician indicates that the 
Applicant-Appellant is' "clinically stable". The doctor also 
indicates that the Applicant-Appellant would be off work for at 
least one week, after which his condition would be rechecked. 
(R.119) 
The next visit appears to be on May 2, 1985. (R.118 
Addendum p. 2) The letter written by Dr. McNaught to the State 
Insurance Fund (Workers Compensation Fund) on May 2 indicates, 
"A history of having rather severe sprains of both ankles." In 
regards to the right ankle injury, Dr. McNaught records: 
When examined today, the symptoms have settled 
down nicely with a good range of motion and no 
pain or swelling and the ankle has been 
immobilized in a brace. He informed me at this 
time that they had given away his job at the Coca 
Cola Company and have advised retraining. 
After our conversation today, I think that 
retraining would be indicated in this individual 
to try to get him into some type of lighter work 
that he will able to continue at for an extended 
period of time. (R.118, Addendum p. 2) 
The medical evidence available to the Administrative 
Law Judge would indicate a history of severe sprains of both 
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ankles, (R.118), radiological evidence of frequent sprains and 
twists of the right ankle as indicated on the date of injury, 
(R.120), and a finding of clinical stability. (R.119) 
Additionally, Dr. McNaught indicates on May 2, 1985 that the 
Applicant-Appellant had no pain, no swelling, and a good range 
of motion. (R.118) It is also noted that the 
Applicant-Appellant had lost his job and had been advised by 
his physician to obtain retraining. A recommendation to be 
retrained in a lighter type of work is highly indicative of a 
stabilized condition. Very few physicians recommend retraining 
while an injured employee is still in the healing process. The 
Applicant-Appellant discontinued his physical therapy as of May 
1, 1985, (R.211) and there was no indication in the doctor's 
letter of May 2, 1985, that a return appointment was 
necessary. There is also no evidence of a change in the 
Applicant-Appellant's ankle condition between May 2, 1985 and 
December 30, 1985, again, indicating medical stability. The 
Applicant-Appellant suffered from chronic ligamentous 
instability. (R.105) This same condition had already been 
surgically treated on the Applicant-Appellant's opposite 
ankle. This is supported in the record as indicated above. 
As of May 2, 1985, the Applicant-Appellant had 
recovered from the temporary aggravation of April 16, 1985 as 
indicated by the doctor's note that the Applicant-Appellant had 
no pain, no swelling, and a good range of motion. (R.118) The 
Judge found that subsequent to Dr. McNaught's letter of May 2, 
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1985, the Applicant-Appellant re-injured the ankle in May of 
1985, and again in June of 1985, both in non-industrial 
situations. (R.251). The Judge also notes that the 
Applicant-Appellant went on a family trip to Chicago in June of 
1985. (R.251, 252) This was substantiated by the 
Applicant-Appellant's own testimony at pages 61, 63, 90, and 91 
of the Court's record. The Administrative Law Judge also found 
several other non-industrial aggravations during that time. 
(R.252) These aggravations were supported medically at page 
115 of the Court's record. 
The Applicant-Appellant's brief alleges that 
Dr. McNaught was attempting conservative treatment during this 
period. There is no support for this allegation in the 
record. Indeed, the record would reflect that there was no 
actual treatment for over three months, from May 2, 1985 
through August 14, 1985. If conservative treatment were 
actually recommended, it would be reasonable to assume that 
there would be some actual "treatment" involved. Indeed, the 
treatment rendered on and after August 14, 1985 involved only 
the Applicant-Appellant's non-related medical problems. There 
is no treatment specifically for the Applicant-Appellant's 
right ankle. The last time that the Applicant-Appellant was 
seen for the April 16, 1985 aggravation was May 2, 1985 at 
which time no further treatment, other than a brace, was 
recommended, and no further office visits were scheduled. Even 
the plaintiff himself was aware that he had been released from 
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treatment by Dr. McNaught. This is evidenced in the 
Applicant-Appellant's testimony at page 92 of the record. When 
the Applicant-Appellant was questioned about a hospital 
admission in October of 1985, the Applicant-Appellant responds, 
Q. Could you have been admitted in the Dixie 
Medical Center in October of '85? 
A. No. 
Mr. Shumate: Just last October. 
A. No. Unless it - - Well, I can vaguely 
remember Dr. McNaught saying after he 
released me that he wanted to see me in a 
couple of months. Just to do a follow-up. 
So it could be Valley View. Is just - - . 
[Emphasis added] 
It is apparent by this entry that even the 
Applicant-Appellant was aware that he had been released from 
Dr. McNaught*s treatment. 
The Applicant-Appellant refers to the case of Booms v. 
Rapp Construction Company, 720 P. 2d 1363 (Utah 1986) for the 
proposition that "stabilization is strictly a medical question 
that is appropriately decided on the basis of medical 
evidence." (Applicant-Appellant's brief at page 10-11) As 
indicated above, the Judge had substantial medical evidence to 
support her position. The Booms case, however, also indicates 
that subsequent to the review of medical evidence, the Judge is 
the finder of fact and, as such, can make the decision as to 
disability. In Booms, there was a conflict between the medical 
evidence presented. The Court in that case concluded: 
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The administrative law judge is the finder of 
fact. The discrepancy between Dr. Tedrow's rating 
of 10 percent psychological impairment and 
Dr. Egan's rating of 20 percent impairment was 
simply a conflict between expert witnesses. In 
such a case, the administrative law judge properly 
exercised his authority to decide the question 
after reviewing the evidence from both sides. 
Id. at 1367. 
It is the duty of the Administrative Law Judge to 
review the evidence submitted and draw a reasonable conclusion 
from said evidence. As referenced above, Section 35-1-88, 
U.C.A. 1953, directs the Commission to receive as evidence and 
use as proof on any fact in dispute, " . . . all evidence 
deemed material and relevant . . . ." 
The Applicant-Appellant points out that the 
Applicant-Appellant did not work during the period from May 3, 
1985 to December 30, 1985. However, the record shows that the 
Applicant-Appellant lost his job some time in May of 1985. 
(R.lll, 118, Addendum p. 2) Referring again to the Booms case, 
the Court held: 
Once a claimant reaches medical stabilization, 
the claimant is moved from temporary to permanent 
status and .he is no longer eligible for temporary 
benefits. Thus, the statutes imply that at some 
point a claimant's disability ceases to be 
temporary and should be recognized as permanent. 
To accept the claimant's argument would require 
that all claimants who are unable to return to 
their prior employment would receive temporary 
total benefits for the entire 312-week statutory 
period. That result is inconsistent with a 
statutory structure which provides for both 
temporary and permanent benefits. 
Id. at 1366, 1367. 
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As the Booms court indicates, the mere fact that an 
injured employee has not returned to his prior employment does 
not and cannot stand for the proposition that he is not yet 
medically stable. 
In the case at hand, the Administrative Law Judge, 
after a thorough review of all of the evidence submitted, 
concluded that the Applicant-Appellant was not entitled to 
temporary total disability compensation from May 3, 1985 to 
December 29, 1985. This was a direct ruling on an issue of 
fact based upon substantial evidence. Therefore, this decision 
should not be overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
V 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE APPLICANT TO ESTABLISH 
DISABILITY. THIS BURDEN HAS NOT BEEN MET BY THE 
APPLICANT-APPELLANT HEREIN. 
The Applicant-Appellant's Argument II alleges that, 
"There is no medical evidence to support the claim that the 
Applicant-Appellant was not totally disabled from May 3, 1985 
through December 29, 1985." (Applicant-Appellant's Brief 
p. 10) It is the Applicant-Appellant's burden to establish 
disability. It is not the Defendants-Respondents' burden to 
prove that he was not totally disabled. The Utah State Supreme 
Court has directly addressed this issue. The Shipley decision 
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involved a situation wherein the plaintiff was claiming that he 
should be declared permanently and totally disabled based on 
his lack of employment in a gainful occupation. The Court in 
that case held: 
To be considered in connection with the 
foregoing is the fact that the burden rests upon 
the plaintiff to prove the extent of his 
disability by evidence which persuades the 
Commission in accordance with his contention. 
In that connection, it is to be had in mind that 
there was not only the evidence upon which the 
plaintiff relies concerning his unemployability, 
but also the evidence, which he seems to ignore, 
of the medical panel which rated his disability 
at 50 percent, which the Commission elected to 
believe and adopt as its finding. It is not 
open to question that if the Commission had 
chosen to make its findings in accordance with 
the plaintiff's evidence, that award would be 
sustained. But upon this review, it is our duty 
to survey the total evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commission's determination; and 
to assume that it believes those aspects of the 
evidence which support its award; and we cannot 
properly reverse when there is a reasonable 
basis therein to support the findings and award 
as made. [Footnotes omitted] 
Id. at 155. 
To allege that it is not the Applicant-Appellant' s 
burden to prove his case, but rather the 
Defendants-Respondents' duty to prove that he does not have a 
case, is unreasonable. 
The Applicant-Appellant concludes Argument II with the 
statement that, "The medical panel did not contradict 
Dr. McNaught in its report of December 8, 1986, (R.219)." 
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(Applicant-Appellant's Brief, page 11) The original Medical 
Panel Report contained in the record at pages 203 and 204, 
indicates, 
In answer to question #2 I find very little 
evidence in either Dr. McNaught's or any of the 
other records that would indicate a causal 
connection between the applicant's need for 
surgery on December 30, 1985 and the industrial 
accident on December 31, 1983 or of April 16, 
1985. I think that his right ankle had several 
other injuries that were non-industrially related 
and I can find no evidence that this was 
industrial in nature. 
Therefore, for answer #3, there would be no 
temporary total disability after May 3rd of 
1986. 
The Applicant-Appellant then filed an objection to the 
Medical Panel Report containing a letter from Dr. McNaught 
indicating that the claims adjuster for the State Insurance 
Fund (Workers Compensation Fund) had indicated that if surgery 
was the only alternative, the Fund would accept liability for 
the same. Subsequent to the Panel's review of the objections, 
the single member Medical Panel issued a one-sentence reply. 
The reply, found in the record at page 219, indicates, "After 
review of James L. Shumate's objections and the letter from 
Dr. McNaught I would agree that his right ankle is industrially 
related and should be covered according to the industrial 
injury to his right ankle." There was no further directive 
from the medical panel regarding temporary total disability. 
On February 3, 1987, the Applicant-Appellant wrote to the 
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Defendant-Respondent, Workers Compensation Fund, indicating 
that it would be necessary to submit the issue of temporary 
total disability to the Administrative Law Judge for her 
determination. The Applicant-Appellant was aware that the 
medical panel did not make a finding as to temporary total 
disability. The Applicant-Appellant asked the Administrative 
Law Judge to make a determination on the issue of temporary 
total disability. (R.220 and 221) When the Administrative Law 
Judge found against temporary total disability for the period 
of May 3, 1985 to December 29, 1985, the Applicant-Appellant 
filed a Motion For Review, which was denied by the entire 
Industrial Commission. (R.271 through 274) 
The Applicant-Appellant in this case failed to meet 
his burden of proof of convincing the Administrative Law Judge 
and the Industrial Commission that the Applicant-Appellant was 
temporarily and totally disabled from May 3, 1985 through 
December 29, 1985. 
ARGUMENT 
VI 
IN CASES WHERE DISABILITY IS BEING CLAIMED, THE 
APPLICANT MUST PROVE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY IS THE DIRECT 
AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE CLAIMED DISABILITY. 
On August 14, 1985, Dr. McNaught recommended that 
surgery be performed for the repair of Mr. Griffith's right 
ankle. (R.116) On August 29, 1985, surgery was approved by 
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the claims adjuster for the State Insurance Fund (Workers 
Compensation Fund). (R.217) Before the Applicant-Appellant 
could undergo surgery, however, he had numerous non-industrial 
medical problems which had to be stabilized prior to surgery. 
Among these serious, non-related, medical conditions were: 
high blood pressure, hypertension, asthma, alcoholism, and 
obesity. (R.110, 111, 112, 113, 129, 131, 132, 133, 138, 152, 
153, and 252) Additionally, the records would tend to indicate 
that • the majority of these medical problems were attributable 
to the actions of the Applicant-Appellant. Regarding the 
Applicant-Appellant's asthmatic condition, the opinion of 
Dr. Enrique Alfaro is evidenced at page 113 of the record. 
Dr. Alfaro indicates, "He does have some shortness of breath 
and this is usually related to the asthma as well as some 
pressure and tightness on his chest, but it usually is 
associated with him not taking his Marax on a regular basis." 
(Emphasis added) Dr. Alfaro also suggests that some of the 
problems that the Applicant-Appellant had during the prior 
surgery on the left ankle may have been due in part to 
alcoholic myocardiopathy. (R.113) 
Dr. Kent B. McDonald indicates at p. 131 of the record 
that the Applicant-Appellant's hypertension was "possibly 
alcohol related." Additionally, the doctor notes alcoholic 
liver disease, hyperuricemia, obesity, and chronic alcohol use 
and abuse. All of the conditions which prohibited the surgery 
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as recommended in August were totally unrelated to the claimed 
industrial injury. 
The Industrial Commission has held that an industrial 
injury must be the direct and proximate cause of a claimed 
disability. In the recent case of Robert C. Large v. Howard 
Trucking of Utah, Inc., Case No. 85000759, (Addendum p. 3-6), 
the Commission reviewed an administrative law judge's order 
holding that the applicant's industrial injury was not the 
direct and proximate cause of his claimed permanent total 
disability. In affirming the Administrative Law Judge's Order, 
the Industrial Commission of Utah ruled: 
The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that 
the applicant most likely is unemployable due to 
a combination of factors including his age (64), 
obesity, lack of transferable skills, prior back 
surgery and the aggravation caused by the March 
25, 1985 incident. However, the Administrative 
Law Judge states that the statute dealing with 
permanent total disability benefits, U.C.A. 
35-1-67, contains language that implies that the 
industrial injury giving rise to the permanent 
total disability must be the proximate or 
dominant cause of the permanent total 
disability. 
The Administrative Law Judge notes that U.C.A. 
35-1-67 begins with the phrase 'in cases of 
permanent total disability.' He states this 
phrase is best interpreted to mean ' in cases of 
industrial injury resulting in, or causing, 
permanent total disability.' Therefore, 
according to this line of reasoning, the 
Administrative Law Judge states it is implied 
that the industrial injury must be the proximate 
or dominate (sic) cause of the permanent total 
disability. (Addendum p. 3-4) 
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The Commission concludes: 
The Commission must agree with the Administrative 
Law Judge that U.C.A. 35-1-67 implies there must 
be a causal connection between the injury and the 
permanent total disability. The Commission finds 
it is logical to presume that the Legislature 
intended permanent total disability benefits for 
those employees whose disabilities result due to 
an industrial injury and not due to a long list 
of other factors. The concept of proximate cause 
serves the purpose of allowing those whose 
disabilities are truly the result of the 
industrial injury to be properly compensation 
(sic). That concept may also eliminate some 
industrially injured individuals from permanent 
total disability compensation, but will not 
eliminate those individuals for other kinds of 
workers' compensation benefits. This result 
seems both logical and fair to the Commission and 
therefore the Commission must affirm the 
Administrative Law Judge's adoption of the 
proximate cause theory as it applies to U.C.A, 
35-1-67. (Addendum p. 4) 
While the Defendants-Respondents acknowledge that this 
particular case was relating to a permanent total disability 
claim and the present claim is for temporary total disability, 
the basis for the theory is the same. An industrial insurance 
carrier should not be required to compensate claimants whose 
claimed disability is not caused by the industrial injury. It 
is obvious in the record, that the delay from the time that 
surgery was actually recommended to the time surgery was 
performed, was not caused by the industrial injury. As such, 
the Administrative Law Judge was correct in disallowing 




In the case of Entwistle Co. v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495, 
498 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court held, "The extent and the 
duration of an employee's disability are questions of fact to 
be determined by the Commission, We review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commission's findings, and when 
there is substantial evidence to support the facts as found by 
the Commission, its order will not be disturbed." [Footnote 
omitted] The Defendants-Respondents respectfully request that 
the Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as affirmed by the 
Industrial Commission, which was based on substantial medical 
evidence and other evidence including the testimony of the 
Applicant-Appellant, be affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We 
would request that the Applicant-Appellant's claim for benefits 
in addition to those awarded, be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, this 21st day of September, 1987. 
ikteg^''-^ 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents, 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
and/or Cedar City Coca Cola Bottling Co. 
560 South Third East 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0420 
Telephone: (801) 533-7842 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS, to 
James L. Shumate, 110 No. Main, Suite H, P.O. Box 623, Cedar 
City, Utah 84720, Erie Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury 
Fund, P.O. Box 45580, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and 
Earl Dorius, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8415, this 21st of September, 1987, first 
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OFFICE CONSULTATION Dr. D. R. McNaugNt 
NAME: James T. Griffith 
DATE: 4-16-85 
History: This man has had recurrent ankle sprains secondary to work injuries at Coca 
Cola Bottling Company. The left ankle became so severe that it was treated surgically 
with a ligament repair. He has been back to work without any difficulty to the left 
ankle. Yesterday he turned over the right ankle while at work. He has had increased 
pain and swelling in the region of the right ankle overnight and today is unable to 
weight bear and is on crutches. Examination slows mild swelling of the ankle, both 
laterally and medially with associated tenderness and a limited range of motion, but 
is clinically stable. X-rays at Valley View Medical Center showed no evidence of 
fracture. The ankle has been braced and he will be off work for at least one week and 




Dictated - not edited 
cc: State Industrial Commission 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420 
33-25457-B6 
Addendum 1 
VALI-LT VIKW M E D I C A L C E N T E R 
5 9 5 S O U T H 75 E A « T 
C I D A H U I T V , U T A H K«7IO 
^one 586-6962 
May 2, 19 S5 
Lee Willis, Claims Adjuster 
State Insuranre Fund 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420 
RE: Janes Griffith 
State Industrial //83-25457-B6 
Dear Mr, Willis: 
This is a letter in follow-up to our conversation that we had on May 2, 
1985 with regards to James Griffith. 
This man, who has been employed by Coca Cola Company in Cedar City, gives 
a history of having rather severe sprains of both ankles. He was unable to 
continue working so we elected to carry out a surgical repair of the 
left ankle. 
This was complicated initially by a cardiac arrest at the time of surgery, 
presumably complicated by his marked hypertension despite his age of 27. 
He has also'sprained his right ankle. He has made a good recovery from the 
left ankle and was able to return to work without difficulty. He presented 
in the office April 16, 1985; and again injured his right ankle with pain and 
swelling. X-ray showed no evidence of fracture. 
The ankle was brace and he was off physical therapy. When examined today, 
the symptoms have settled down nicely with a good range of motion and no pain or 
swelling and the ankle has been immobilized in a brace. He informed me at this 
time that they have given away his job at the Coca Cola Company and have advised 
retraining. 
After our conversation today, 1 think that retraining would be indicated in this 
individual to try to get him into some type of lighter work that he will be able 
to continue at for an extended period of time. Thank you for your assistance. 
Sincerely , 
Dr. D. R. McNaught 
3RM/r,d 
inctateci - not edited 
Addendum 2 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No: 85000759 
* 




vs. * ORDER DENYING 
HOWARD TRUCKING OF UTAH, INC. and/or * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH and * 




* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On September 3, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the 
applicant in the above-captioned case temporary total compensation, permanent 
partial impairment and medical expenses related to an incident occurring on 
March 25, 1985. The incident involved the applicant's fall from a ladder 
affixed to a semi-truck. At the time of the fall, the applicant was in the 
process of completing a driving test which he was required to pass before 
being hired by the defendant. As such, he had not been officially hired by 
the defendant/employer at the time of the injury. The Administrative Law 
Judge found that the purposes of workers* compensation were served by 
extending coverage to the applicant even though he was technically a 
non-employee. 
On April 17
 f 1987, counsel for the applicant filed a Request for 
Hearing for determination of the applicant's permanent total disability. No 
hearing was scheduled and the Administrative Law Judge issued Supplemental 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on July 28, 1987. In that 
Order, the Administrative Law Judge denies permanent total disability 
benefits. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that the applicant most 
likely is unemployable due to a combination of factors including his age (64), 
obesity, lack of transferable skills, prior back surgery and the aggravation 
caused by the March 25, 1985 incident. However, the Administrative Law Judge 
states that the statute dealing with permanent total disability benefits, 
U.C.A. 35-1-67, contains language that implies that the industrial injury 
giving rise to the permanent total disability must be the proximate or 
dominant cause of the permanent total disability. 
The Administrative Law Judge notes that U.C.A. 35-1-6 7 begins with 
the phrase "in cases of permanent total disability." He states this phrase is 
best interpreted to mean "in cases of industrial injury resulting in, or 
causing, permanent total disability." Therefore, according to this line of 
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ROBERT C. LARGE 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
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reasoning, the Administrative Law Judge states it is implied that the 
industrial injury must be the proximate or dominate cause of the permanent 
total disability. In the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds the 
industrial injury is the immediate cause of the permanent total disability or 
the cause closest in time to the result. However, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds the industrial injury is not the proximate or dominant cause of 
the applicant's permanent . total disability. The Administrative Law Judge 
finds the industrial injury adds little to the applicant's overall 
non-employability. Because the injury was the proximate cause of temporary 
total disability, medical expenses and some permanent partial impairment, the 
Administrative Law Judge found those benefits payable but denied an award of 
permanent total disability. On August 12, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 
35-1-82.53, counsel for the applicant filed a 1 line Motion for Review. That 
Motion for Review simply states that the definition of employee is the same 
for permanent total disability as it is for other workers compensation 
benefits. The Commission takes this to mean that counsel for the applicant 
feels that if temporary benefits are awarded because the applicant is deemed 
to have been an employee even though the facts technically show him to have 
been a non-employee, then permanent total benefits should be awarded on that 
same theory if the applicant qualifies for those benefits. 
The Commission finds the only issue on review is whether the 
applicant is entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The issue 
regarding what kind of causal connection there must be between the industrial 
injury and the permanent total disability has not been addressed to date by 
the Commission. What causes impairment is a question that is easier to answer 
by reference to a medical opinion. What causes disability on a permanent 
basis is not so easily pinpointed. The Commission must agree with the 
Administrative Law Judge that U.C.A. 35-1-67 implies there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the permanent total disability. The 
Commission finds it is logical to presume that the Legislature intended 
permanent total disability benefits for those employees whose disabilities 
result due to an industrial injury and not due to a long list of other 
factors. The concept of proximate cause serves the purpose of allowing those 
whose disabilities are truly the result of the industrial injury to be 
properly compensation. That concept may also eliminate some industrially 
injured individuals from permanent total disability compensation, but will not 
eliminate those individuals for other kinds of workers compensation benefits. 
This result seems both logical and fair to the Commission and therefore the 
Commisison must affirm the Administrative Law Judge's adoption of the 
proximate cause theory as it applies to U.C.A. 35-1-67. As result, the 
Commission must deny the applicant's Motion for Review. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's August 12, 1987 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's July 28, 1987 
Supplemental Order is hereby affirmed and final with further appeal to the 
Court of Appeals only pursuant to U-C.A. 35-1-83. 
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